

| Footnote | Text After Declassification and Redactions |
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| 17 | [REDACTED] According to Steele, his cooperation with our investigation was done with the consent of his government. |
| 21 | [REDACTED] We did not review the entirety of FISA collections obtained through FISA surveillance and physical searches targeting Carter Page. We reviewed only those documents collected under FISA authority that were pertinent to our review. |
| 61 | [REDACTED] Criteria used by agents and analysts to weigh the risks and benefits are: (1) access: [REDACTED] [REDACTED] (2) suitability: [REDACTED] [REDACTED] (3) susceptibility: [REDACTED] [REDACTED] (4) accessibility: [REDACTED] [REDACTED] (5) security: [REDACTED] |
| 63 | [REDACTED] CHSPG Section 3.5.1.1 Special approval and notification requirements also are necessary for CHS operations in extraterritorial jurisdiction, such as tasking a CHS to contact the subject of an investigation who is located in a foreign country. The requirements and notifications differ, for example, depending on whether the CHS operating is a national security extraterritorial operation or a criminal extraterritorial operation involving a sensitive circumstance. Approval from an FBI Assistant Director is necessary for national security extraterritorial operations, [REDACTED] |
| 164 | <p>[REDACTED] During October 25, 2018 testimony before the House Judiciary and House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Papadopoulos stated that the source of the information he shared with the FFG official was a professor from London, Joseph Mifsud. Papadopoulos testified that Mifsud provided him with information about the Russians possessing "dirt" on Hilary Clinton. Papadopoulos raised the possibility during his Congressional testimony that Mifsud might have been "working with the FBI and this was some sort of operation" to entrap Papadopoulos. As discussed in Chapter Ten of this report, the OIG searched the FBI's database of Confidential Human Sources (CHS), and did not find any records indicating that Mifsud was an FBI CHS, or that Mifsud's discussions with Papadopoulos were part of any FBI operation. In Chapter Ten, we also note that the FBI requested information on Mifsud from another U.S. government agency, and received a response from the agency indicating that Mifsud had no relationship with the agency and the agency had no derogatory information on Mifsud.</p> <p>(U) We refer to Joseph Mifsud by name in this report because the Department publicly revealed Mifsud's identity in The Special Counsel's Report (public version). According to The Special Counsel's Report, Papadopoulos first met Mifsud in March 2016, after Papadopoulos had already learned that he would be serving as a foreign policy advisor for the Trump campaign. According to The Special Counsel's Report, Mifsud only showed interest in Papadopoulos after learning of Papadopoulos's role in the campaign, and told Papadopoulos about the Russians possessing "dirt" on then candidate Clinton in late April 2016. The Special Counsel found that Papadopoulos lied to the FBI about the timing of his discussions with Mifsud, as well as the nature and extent of his communications with Mifsud. The Special Counsel charged Papadopoulos under Title 18 U.S.C. § 1001 with making false statements. Papadopoulos pled guilty and was sentenced to 14 days in prison. <i>See The Special Counsel's Report, Vol. 1, at 192-94.</i></p> |
| 166 | [REDACTED] According to Legat, the senior intelligence official stated at the meeting with the USG official that the FFG information "sounds like an FBI matter." |
| 205 | [REDACTED] During his time as an FBI CHS, Steele received a total of \$95,000 from the FBI. We reviewed the FBI paperwork for those payments, each of which required Steele's Signed acknowledgement. On each document, of which there were eight, was the caption "CHS Payment" and "CHS's Payment Name." A signature page was missing for one of the payments. |
| 208 | (U) A 2015 report concerning oligarchs written by the FBI's Transnational Organized Crime Intelligence Unit (TOCIU) noted that from January through May 2015, 10 Eurasian oligarchs sought meetings with the FBI, and 5 of these had their intermediaries contact Steele. The report noted that Steele's contact with 5 Russian oligarchs in a short period of time was unusual and recommended that a validation review be |

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| | completed on Steele because of this activity. The FBI's Validation Management Unit did not perform such an assessment on Steele until early 2017 after, as described in Chapter Six, the Crossfire Hurricane team requested an assessment in the context of Steele's election reporting. Handling Agent 1 told us he had seen the TOCIU report and was not concerned about its findings concerning Steele because he was aware of Steele's outreach efforts to Russian oligarchs. We found that the TOCIU report was not included in Steele's Delta file. Handling Agent 1 said that he found preparation of the TOCIU report "curious" because he believed that TOCIU was aware of Steele's outreach efforts and fully supported them. |
| 210 | AS we discuss in Chapter Six, members of the Crossfire Hurricane team were unaware of Steele's connections to Russian Oligarch 1. |
| 211 | Sensitive source reporting from June 2017 indicated that a Person affiliated to Russian Oligarch 1 was possibly aware of Steele's election investigation as of early July 2016. |
| 214 | Steele told us that the source network did not involve sources from his time as a former foreign government employee and was developed entirely in the period after he retired from governmental service. |
| 242 | The FBI advised the OIG that the Crossfire Hurricane investigation was a national security investigation, and these activities therefor involved national security extraterritorial CHS operations. |
| 244 | Person 1 |
| 253 | <p>(U) These seven reports, with selected highlights, were:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (U) Report 130 (Putin and his colleagues were surprised and disappointed that leaks of Clinton's emails had not had a greater impact on the campaign; a stream of hacked Clinton material had been injected by the Kremlin into compliant western media outlets like WikiLeaks and the stream would continue until the election); Report 132 (a top level Russian intelligence figure claimed that Putin regrets the operation to interfere in the U.S. elections); (U) Report 134 (a close associate of Rosneft President Sechin confirmed a secret meeting with Carter Page in July; Sechin was keen to have sanctions on the company lifted and offered up to a 19 percent stake in return); (U) Report 135 (Trump attorney Michael Cohen was heavily engaged in a cover up and damage control in an attempt to prevent the full details of Trump's relationship with Russia being exposed; Cohen had met secretly with several Russian Presidential Administration Legal Department officials; immediate issues were efforts to contain further scandals involving Manafort's commercial and political role in Russia/Ukraine and to limit damage from the exposure of Carter Page's secret meetings with Russian leadership figures in Moscow the previous month); (U) Report 136 (Kremlin insider reports that Cohen's secret meeting/s with Kremlin officials in August 2016 was/were held in Prague); Report 137 (Divyekin was moved from his position in the Presidential Administration to one in the Duma; this move followed Divyekin being exposed in the western media, e.g., the <i>Yahoo News</i> story of September 23, 2016, as a secret interlocutor of Page); and Report 139 (Person 1 was forced to lie low abroad following his/her exposure in the western media and was currently in). |
| 265 | "Facilities" are the items to be searched or subjected to electronic surveillance, such as email accounts, telephone numbers, physical premises, or personal property. |

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| 276 | <p>As described below, it appears the desire to have FISA authority in place before Monday, October, 17, was due, at least in part, to the fact that Carter Page was expected to travel to the United Kingdom and South Africa shortly thereafter, and the Crossfire Hurricane team wanted FISA coverage targeting Carter Page in place before that trip.</p> |
| 293 | <p>Her signature also specifically authorized overseas surveillance of Carter Page under Section 705(b) of the FISA and Executive Order 12333 Section 2.5.</p> |
| 296 | <p>Although Case Agent 2's summary of the early October meeting with Steele states that Steele described his former position in a manner consistent with the footnote in the FISA application, other documentation (discussed in Chapter Eight) indicates that Steele's former employer told the FBI in November 2016, after the first application was filed, that Steele had served in a "moderately senior" position, not a "high-ranking" position as Steele suggested.</p> |
| 301 | <p>As discussed in Chapter Four, Person 1</p> |
| 302 | <p>According to a document circulated among Crossfire Hurricane team members and supervisors in early October 2016, Person 1 had historical contact with persons and entities suspected of being linked to RIS. The document described reporting that Person 1 "was rumored to be a former KGB/SVR officer." In addition, in late December 2016, Department Attorney Bruce Ohr told SSA 1 that he had met with Glenn Simpson and that Simpson had assessed that Person 1 was a RIS officer who was central in connecting Trump to Russia.</p> |
| 303 | <p>Although an email indicates that the OI Attorney learned in March 2017 that the FBI had an open case on Person 1, the subsequent renewal applications did not include this fact. According to the OI Attorney, and as reflected in Renewal Application Nos. 2 and 3, the FBI expressed uncertainty about whether this sub-source was Person 1. However, other FBI documents in the same time period reflect that the ongoing assumption by the Crossfire Hurricane team was that this sub-source was Person 1.</p> |
| 328 | <p>Priestap told the OIG that he recalled that he may have made a commitment to Steele's former employer not to document the former's employer's views on Steele as a condition for obtaining the information.</p> |
| 334 | <p>When interviewed by the FBI, the Primary Sub-source stated that he/she did not view his/her contacts as a network of sources, but rather as friends with whom he/she has conversations about current events and government relations. The Primary Sub-source</p> |
| 339 | <p>The Primary Sub-source also told the FBI at these interviews that the subsource who provided the information about the Carter Page-Sechin meeting had connections to Russian Intelligence Services (RIS).</p> |
| 342 | <p>In late January 2017, a member of the Crossfire Hurricane team received information that RIS may have targeted Orbis and research all publicly available information about it.</p> <p>However, an early June 2017 USIC report indicated that two persons affiliated with RIS were aware of Steele's election investigation in early July 2016. The Supervisory Intel Analyst told us he was aware of these reports, but that he had no information as of June 2017 that Steele's election reporting source network had been penetrated or compromised</p> |
| 347 | <p>The FBI received information in early June 2017 which revealed that, among other things, there were personal and business ties between the sub-source and Steele's Primary Sub-source; contacts between the sub-source and an individual in the Russian Presidential Administration in June/July 2016; and the sub-source voicing strong support for candidate Clinton in the 2016 U.S. elections. The Supervisory Intel Analyst told us that the FBI did not have Section 702 coverage on any other Steele sub-source.</p> |

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| 350 | <p>██████████ In addition to the information in Steele's Delta file documenting Steele's frequent contacts with representatives for multiple Russian oligarchs, we identified reporting the Crossfire Hurricane team received from ██████████ indicating the potential for Russian disinformation influencing Steele's election reporting. A January 12, 2017, report relayed information from ██████████ outlining an inaccuracy in a limited subset of Steele's reporting about the activities of Michael Cohen. The ██████████ stated that it did not have high confidence in this subset of Steele's reporting and assessed that the referenced subset was part of a Russian disinformation campaign to denigrate U.S. foreign relations. A second report from the same ██████████ five days later stated that a person named in the limited subset of Steele's reporting had denied representations in the reporting and the ██████████ assessed that the person's denials were truthful. A USIC report dated February 27, 2017, contained information about an individual with reported connections to Trump and Russia who claimed that the public reporting about the details of Trump's sexual activities in Moscow during a trip in 2013 were false, and that they were the product of RIS "infiltrate[ing] a source into the network" of a ██████████ who compiled a dossier of that individual on Trump's activities. The ██████████ noted that it had no information indicating that the individual had special access to RIS activities or information.</p> |
| 354 | <p>██████████ We did not review the entirety of FISA collections obtained through FISA surveillance and physical searches targeting Carter Page. We reviewed only those documents collected under FISA authority that were pertinent to our review.</p> |
| 362 | <p>██████████ Her signature also specifically authorized overseas surveillance of Carter Page under Section 705(b) of the FISA and Executive Order 12333 Section 2.5.</p> |
| 365 | <p>██████████ In Chapter Five, we describe how the FBI did not specifically and explicitly advise OI about the FBI's assessment before the first FISA application that Person 1 was the sub-source who provided the information relied upon in the application from Steele reports 80, 95, and 102; that Steele had provided derogatory information regarding Person 1; and that the FBI had an open counterintelligence investigation on Person 1. As noted previously, in the next chapter, we describe the information from the Primary Sub-source interview concerning Person 1 and the information that was not shared with OI about inconsistencies between the Primary Sub-source and Steele concerning information provided by Person 1.</p> |
| 368 | <p>██████████ Boente's signature also specifically authorized overseas surveillance of Carter Page under Section 705(b) of the FISA and Executive Order 12333 Section 2.5.</p> |
| 372 | <p>██████████ The third renewal application stated that [SEQUESTERED]</p> |
| 377 | <p>██████████ Rosenstein's signature also specifically authorized overseas surveillance of Carter Page under Section 705(b) of the FISA and Executive Order 12333 Section 2.5.</p> |
| 379 | <p>██████████ On May 10, 2019, NSD sent a second letter to the FISC concerning the Carter Page FISA applications, advising the court of two indicants in which the FBI failed to comply with the SMPs applicable to physical searches conducted pursuant to the final FISA orders issued by the court on June 29, 2017. According to the letter, the FBI took and retained on an FBI-issued cell phone photographs of certain property taken in connection with a FISA-authorized physical search on July 13, 2017, which NSD assessed did not comport with the SMPs. In addition in a separate incident on July 29, 2017, the FBI took photographs in connection with another FISA-authorized physical search and transferred the photographs to an electronic folder on the FBI's classified secret network. . According to NSD, court staff contacted an NSD official in response to this letter and asked when the information at issue would be removed from non-compliant FBI systems, and asked about other cases that might be impacted by the same problem. On October 9, 2019, NSD sent another letter to the FISC advising the court that the FBI completed the remedial process for the information associated with the Page FISA applications and information from other cases impacted by the same problem.</p> |
| 389 | <p>██████████ Email communications reflect that in March 2017—after the first FISA application and first renewal were filed and before the last two renewals—the Supervisory Intel Analyst reviewed the first FISA application and the first renewal at OGC's request to assist with potential redactions before the Department responded to Congressional information requests. The Supervisory Intel Analyst provided comments to the OGC Attorney, including advising him that the Primary Sub-source was not ██████████ as stated in the FISA applications, and asking</p> |

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| | whether a correction should be made. The Supervisory Intel Analyst did not provide any other comments relating to the Primary Sub-source, and he told us that he did not notice anything else potentially inaccurate or incomplete in the applications at that time. |
| 464 | ██████████ The FBI also requested information on Mifsud from another U.S. government agency, and received a response from that agency indicating that Mifsud had no relationship with that agency. |
| 475 | ██████████ We notified the FBI upon learning during our review that ██████████ material that the CHS had provided to the FBI were still maintained in FBI files. |
| 484 | ██████████ Papadopoulos has stated that the source of the information he shared with the FFG was a professor from London, Joseph Mifsud, and has raised the possibility that Mifsud may have been working with the FBI. As described in Chapter Ten of this report, the OIG searched the FBI's database of Confidential Human Sources (CHSs) and did not find any records indicating that Mifsud was an FBI CHS, or that Mifsud's discussions with Papadopoulos were part of any FBI operation. The FBI also requested information on Mifsud from another U.S. government agency and received no information indicating that Mifsud had a relationship with that agency or that the agency had any derogatory information concerning Mifsud. |
| 526 | ██████████ As described in Chapter Two, the special approval and notification requirements for CHS operations in extraterritorial jurisdiction differ, for example, depending on whether the CHS operation is a national security extraterritorial operation or a criminal extraterritorial operation involving a sensitive circumstance. Approval from an FBI Assistant Director is necessary for national security extraterritorial operations, ██████████ ██████████ CHSPG Sections 19.2, 19.3.3. Because the Crossfire Hurricane investigation at the outset was a national security investigation, the extraterritorial CHS operations in the case required Assistant Director approval. |